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KEY MESSAGES: 
The relative positive economic growth experienced by most African countries in the recent 
decade has come with insufficient demand stimulation. The concern of poverty at the 
forefront of economic policy, the need for inclusive growth and sustainable development, 
inter alia, brings forward the inevitable question of the monetary policy responsibility. 
Accordingly, the monetarist theory that focuses on price stability inherently neglects the 
demand stimulation aspect of economic prosperity.  
Since the mid 1980s, the monetarist school driven by its central aim of fighting inflation and 
maintaining credibility in markets and economic agents has been priority for monetary 
authorities (especially in Africa). To this effect, while good results in terms of inflation 
targeting has been achieved in many African countries; economic growth has sometimes been 
low. Hence, in light of the above, using a statistical and theoretical debate method, the 
Credible Monetary Policy (CMP)
i
 paradox is traceable to Africa.  Accordingly, with the 
promising economic environment in Africa, we recommend the promotion of a monetary 
policy oriented toward improving economic growth under the constraint of price stability.  
In light of the above view, there are some note worthy signs such the recent decision by the 
two CFA zone central banks to either maintain interest rates at a low level or reduce it despite 
tightening measures of monetary policy taken by the European Central Bank (ECB) earlier in 
the year. In the same vein, the central bank of South Africa has maintained its policy of low 
interest rates with an objective of economic expansion.  
Since, the 2008 financial crisis, the consolidation of the Federal Reserve’s declared final 
objective of lowering interest rates and making emergency loans is an eloquent example to 
reassure African central banks in the choice of the pro-growth monetary policy option.  
Keywords: Pro growth monetary policy; CMP paradox; Financing enterprises; African 
central bank.  
Classification JEL: C23; C33; E52; E58. 
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1) INTRODUCTION 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the African Development Bank (AfDB) and the 
United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) agree on the following: beyond 
effective good performance in terms of economic growth, African economies have a higher 
growth potential that can enable them to become a potential growth pole (UNECA, 2012; 
AfDB, 2013). Accordingly, with the involvement of authorities, this potential can easily be 
realized with respect to the Keynesian theory because total liberalism has been the source of 
destabilization and exposure to crises.  Thus the aim of unleashing the economic potential of 
Africa can only be achieved with an optimal choice based on contextualization of cyclical 
interventions and taking into account a global environment characterized mainly by shocks 
and crises.  
 
The latest financial and debt crises have led to the launching of several stimulus plans to 
rescue the global economy. Whereas Africa was virtually absent from the concert of world 
recovery plans, the majority of sub-regions in the continent have felt a pinch of the crises. The 
Economic and Monetary Community of Central African States (CEMAC) and Economic and 
Monetary Community of West African States (WAEMU) felt (albeit with a slight delay) and 
continue to feel the heavy effects of the crises.  
 
Indeed, the relative disconnection between African banking and financial systems and the 
global financial markets (with the exception of a few countries like South Africa) and 
stabilization policies carried-out by monetary authorities since 1990s banking reorganizations, 
have initially put them out of heavy direct effects experienced by banks, insurance companies 
and other international financial centers in the world. However, African economies are not 
spared. Effects of the crisis are already felt by African countries and probably will continue in 
the long run.  
 
Both effects can thus be identified: the effects affecting the financial sphere and the those 
affecting the real economy. At the financial sphere, the situation of expensive credit 
experienced for several years by African economies was exacerbated. Indeed, there is a 
paradox between the presence of abundant bank liquidity and the lack of funding on the one 
hand and the excessive cost of credit on the other hand (NDjanyou, 2001; Asongu, 2013 a,b,c; 
Nguena, 2013). This situation by improving enterprises finance issue tends to negatively 
impact investment and therefore economic growth. Furthermore, Nguena (2013) in a country-
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level study finds that SMEs have more chance to get short term credit than long term credit. 
Thus these realities in Africa allow us to underline the monetary policy issue in Africa and 
rethink its implementation and final objectives which are important for economic growth. 
Since the mid-80s, monetary policy is the main policy instrument used by most governments. 
The need to fight against inflation and maintaining credibility with markets and economic 
agents have thus led the authorities to give priority to this instrument. Indeed the current 
neoclassical school focuses on central bank credibility as an efficiency factor of its monetary 
policy from the perspective of achieving its ultimate objective of price stability. These 
developments which derive some of their sources from theoretical analyzes of monetary 
policy in terms of credibility
ii
 could be the reason of good results in the fight against inflation 
in Africa with however a low economic growth. Yet as the first section of this paper will 
show, the CMP in the fight against inflation should theoretically have a positive influence on 
economic growth.  
Hence, due to the poor performance of economic growth in African countries, monetary 
policy modeled on monetary theory can be challenged in favor of a Keynesian approach.  
In order to answer this question we will go through a theoretical and empirical literature 
review applied to the African context which first highlights the paradox of monetary policy in 
terms of its impact on economic growth and secondly propose a model of monetary policy for 
economic growth in Africa. For a robust and homogeneous analysis we will in the population 
of Africa consider the sample of sub-Saharan Africa countries with a particular focus on 
CEMAC zone countries. This analysis and debate is more interesting and justified since 
practically, several central banks in Africa have decided to not only focus on price stability as 
recommended by the monetarist school but also to stimulate economic growth by (for 
example) lowering interest rates. 
 
2) Theoretical link between the CMP in terms of fight against  inflation and 
economic growth.  
The origin of theoretical analysis on the credibility and independence is Kydland and Prescott 
(1977) who highlighted the problem of time inconsistency and the ambition to solve this 
problem especially in the case of monetary policy. Thus they propose as solution a policy 
based on a rule. 
The benefits of inflation come from the existence in their model of a non-vertical Phillips 
curve in the short term. This implies that unanticipated monetary expansion lowers the 
unemployment rate below the equilibrium rate and increase activity in real terms.  
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The cost of inflation most often described in the literature is meanwhile scrambling of signals 
from prices by inflation. Indeed, higher inflation generally leads to a higher variability of 
inflation. This will result in an increase in uncertainty about future inflation and a decline in 
the information contained in relative prices. This increased uncertainty and the scrambling of 
relative prices will act negatively on investment and innovation and, therefore, be unfavorable 
for factor productivity and hence economic growth.  
Under the assumptions listed above, contrary to a policy rule, discretionary policy leads to a 
higher inflation and well being costs. While this offers more flexibility for governments, it is 
better in theory for a central bank to “tie their hands”. This commitment would earn the 
credibility to conduct monetary policy which is ultimately the best point of view of welfare 
and especially GDP growth. Under these conditions, the CMP would have an impact on 
economic growth.  
As an illustration, a synthetic chart
iii
 of the link between a CMP and economic growth is 
presented below. 
Chart: Theoretical link between a CMP and economic growth. 
 
 
Source: “Le paradoxe de la crédibilité” with author modification. 
 
3) PARADOX OF CMP IN AFRICA: Confrontation of theoretical evolution to practical 
results in the context of application.  
"Country, big or small, cannot aspire to a policy of development if it does not control 
monetary arrangements." This speech of Amin (1973) on monetary barriers to intra-African 
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trade expansion and development in Africa, highlights the importance of monetary policy on 
development in Africa. It implicitly assumes that monetary policy affects real variables of the 
economy. However the theory is not unanimous about the reality of such a link: 
- The long-term effects of monetary policy: 
From a theoretical point of view, the effects of long-term monetary policy were first, 
according to Solow (1956), studied under the Neo classical growth model. The question was 
repeated with the development of endogenous growth models. The development of 
endogenous growth models has helped to clarify the mechanisms by which money creation 
and inflation expectations are likely to influence long term economic growth. Thus, most of 
these models emphasize the role played by the household savings rate. A monetary policy that 
would positively affect this variable could have a real effect on the growth rate. 
 
- Skeptical theses for a limited relationship between Monetary Policy and Economic Growth:  
Very old theses asserting a limited relationship are mainly shared by monetarists such as 
Friedman (1968) and by some prominent economists as Poole. According to them the only 
purpose of monetary policy is to ensure price stability, by preventing any counter-cyclical 
action which tends to disturb markets, as uncertainty weighs on action deadline of monetary 
policy. Authors have taken this view by affirming that according to Friedman, monetary 
policy affects only nominal variables such as nominal interest rates or price levels; 
Accordingly, the central bank cannot hope to be effective by targeting any value of real 
variable, because the impact on real variables such as GDP
iv
 or the unemployment rate are 
transient in nature and very random.  
 
In order to resolve this theoretical debate, it is necessary to make a comparison with African 
reality instead of a simple implementation of what is fashionable elsewhere. 
 
3-1) Confrontation of the monetary policy theory to the application context  
The neoclassical orthodoxy argues in favor of money neutrality in the short and long term. 
This consensus based on life cycles theory orients the role of the monetary authority to the 
absolute pursuit of price stability over the medium and long term. It assumes that agents 
maximize their intertemporal utility by using the complete knowledge of the complex 
economy. Retaining the same analytical framework, the New Keynesian Economics propose a 
new synthesis which consists of introducing the assumption of sticky prices and wages. Under 
this review, price rigidity is the cause of distortions in consumption that cause the economy to 
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not realize its growth potential (Gali, 2002). For example, New Keynesian economics, rather 
than assuming that prices react to market imbalances, guess they are set optimally, so as to 
best serve the interests of firms that are supposed to fix them, (Woodford, 2003). Only then, 
an active monetary policy can correct distortions caused by the rational behavior of firms. 
This policy is for the Central Bank to follow a rule that the interest rate is adjusted to respond 
to the inflation differential and the output gap. In this context, money is not neutral. 
  
In fact, the introduction of nominal rigidities in a model of real business cycle led to the 
reformulation of the Phillips curve, implying a lack of trade-off between inflation and product 
(Gali, 2002). So that, if the Central Bank is committed to price stability, it can achieve 
stability of output gap. Under this model, a change in monetary policy affects the product 
immediately when it is not possible that all prices and wages adjust themselves. Thus, the 
analysis of New Keynesian Economics shares with the analysis of the New Classical School 
the principle of a monetary policy dedicated only to the stability of general price level 
consistent with the search for neutrality. If we follow this analysis, in which prices are 
flexible, it is not necessary to conduct an active monetary policy to stabilize the economy. So 
it is only in a world characterized by fixed prices that we must refer to monetary policy. This 
is the case for most African countries. However it is in the U.S. that this policy is most active; 
In Africa it is never used for product and employment stimulation. There is an obvious 
contradiction here. Discretionary policies, especially monetary policies, are needed in the 
African continent where the performance in terms of price stability is well established, 
providing a possibility that monetary authorities could take advantage. Inflation is only the 
price to pay for economic stimulus. Moreover, the strict application of an inadequate rule, far 
from guaranteeing neutrality can only generate real distortions. 
 
3-2) Which real goal for pro growth monetary policy in Africa?  
According to Epstein G. (2005) in the last two decades, there has been a global sea change in 
the theory and practice of central banking policy. Actually and globally the dominant practice 
approach to monetary policy consists of the central bank independence with a focus on 
inflation fighting (including adopting formal inflation targeting) and the use of indirect 
methods of monetary policy like short-term interest rates as opposed to direct methods such as 
credit ceilings. It is with this framework that price stability and inflation targeting have been 
identified as priority objective assigned to the Central Bank in many African economies. 
South Africa and Ghana for example, clearly show the inflation targeting as an explicit 
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strategy of monetary policy. The contemporary economic analysis justifies this choice by its 
importance to the economic situation in the long run. This is an institutional framework within 
which the action of the Central Bank should be primarily oriented to price stability which 
means low and stable inflation. The Central Bank exercises control on the economy through 
its intervention on the interbank money market, as it is controlling the quantity or the price but 
not both variables simultaneously. They therefore can pursue only a single objective in the 
sense of Tinbergen (1954). Price growth is naturally selected because of the existence of a 
strong relationship between the quantity of money in circulation and the general price level 
(Friedman, 1968). In addition, the economic and social costs of inflation are the main 
motivations for the choice of price stability as an objective. More recent theoretical 
developments on expectations emphasize the credibility factor as guarantor of monetary 
policy effectiveness. The role and effectiveness of monetary policy is most often analyzed 
with reference to monetary rules whose general objective is to improve the wellbeing of 
people through the stabilization of the economy on its long-run equilibrium. It is assumed that 
this equilibrium is in no way affected by monetary policy and depends only on structural 
variables such as the natural rate of unemployment. In this perspective, the price stability 
objective is understandable. However, is it possible that this general point of view should be 
applied in Africa without contextualization?  
 
Concerning this issue, by trying to see how central banks can become agents of development, 
Epstein G. (2005) argues that the neo-liberal and monetarist approach to monetary policy is 
highly idiosyncratic in that, as a package, it is dramatically different from the historically 
dominant theory and practice of central banking, not only in the developing world, but 
notably, in the now developed countries themselves. According to him more than the current 
monetary policy fashion which is to consider that the only roles central banks can play as 
agents of development is to create a context of “macroeconomic stability” including financial 
stability through financial regulations, central banks can do better. In our histories, we can see 
that for much of central banking history, many central banks have aspired to do much more 
than that, with a number of them even seeing themselves as “agents of development” in the 
self-aware meaning of the term. Indeed throughout the early and recent history of central 
banking in the U.S., England, Europe, and elsewhere, financing governments, managing 
exchange rates, and supporting economic sectors by using “direct methods” of intervention 
have been among the most important tasks of central banking and, in many cases, were among 
the reasons for their existence. Western central banks’ (UK, Europe, Japan, US) monetary 
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policy after the second war were oriented to financing and managing government debts 
accumulated during war in the short  term and rebuilding national economies by providing 
social need often under government’s direction in the long term. Central banks utilized a 
variety of credit allocation techniques to accomplish their economic growth goals. The 
neoliberal monetary policy package, then, is drastically out of step with the history and 
dominant practice of central banking throughout most of its history. At the end of this 
explanation we realize that the monetary policies based on monetarist theory have not been 
applied in other countries and continent without a contextualization. Focusing on inflation 
fighting and price stability only can reduce the growth potential of African economies.  
 
A low inflation rate also has drawbacks. On the one hand, there is the risk of plunging the 
economy into a liquidity trap and a deflationary spiral. In this situation, higher real interest 
rates may not be unlimited (since nominal rates can not fall below zero) and the monetary 
authorities might lose control of the economy. On the other hand, inflation may be too low 
and cause a rise in unemployment because of the downward rigidity of nominal wages. 
Adjustments of real wages may be made necessary by regional or sectoral shocks. However, 
such adjustments are probably more difficult when inflation is very low or even zero. Recent 
pronouncements of the G3 for the activity under the context of financial crisis management 
have put into question the monetarist orthodoxy regarding the implementation of monetary 
policy (Goodfriend 2010). Good monetary policy is crucial to the functioning of the economy: 
monetary and credit offer vast opportunities to stimulate, stabilize or slow down a modern 
economy. With this in mind, these days, we can consider that the dominant model of 
monetary policy is no longer adapted to the new characteristics of the economies, as 
globalization has caused the disappearance of inflation risk. In this sense, a central bank could 
be a victim of its own success and face what we can call the paradox of credibility. From a 
global supply-demand equilibrium model point of view, there should be an alternative 
between demand policy and supply policy for an optimal equilibrium. In the case of most of 
African countries the best result in the fight against inflation should allow them relative 
possibility to follow this measure by supply policy. 
 
Therefore, to determine the orientation of monetary policy by tackling only inflation would 
have two possible consequences. On one hand, the credibility of the commitment of central 
banks to strengthen the fight against inflation and other structural factors likely to contain 
inflationary pressures. On the other hand, while inflation expectations in the long run are 
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better anchored around the target of the central banks, an unsustainable expansionary phase 
could be reflected with a delay in an acceleration of inflation (Mésonnier, 2004). On this 
view, credible monetary policies that focused exclusively on price stability may have 
contributed to the development of macro-financial imbalances in the late 1990s during the 
advent of information and communication technology. However it was not the case. It would 
be inappropriate to contemporary opened economies, interdependent, with high international 
mobility of goods, capital and labor. The theory of divine coincidence which argues that by 
only stabilizing inflation as an objective, the monetary authority also stabilizes the economy 
does not seem to be applicable in practice (Bordes, 2007). A theoretical contribution of 
Blanchard and Gali (2005), shows that this divine coincidence only come from the fact that, in 
the models used, a number of imperfections (for example the real wage rigidities) that exist in 
the economy are ignored. If they are taken into account, the divine coincidence disappears. So 
it would be better for African Central Banks to target principally economic growth under the 
constraint of a low inflation objective.  
 
4) PARADOX OF CMP IN AFRICA: From mixed empirical results to concrete State 
reaction examples. 
Bernard (2000) addresses the question of the impact of monetary policy on economic growth, 
with a purely Keynesian and panel data approach, without focusing on the credibility aspect. 
The results appear disappointing in the case of low-level economic and financial 
development, but very encouraging for countries that have a high income level. Before him, 
Kone (2000) had analyzed the relative effectiveness of monetary and fiscal policies through 
their actions on economic activity of the WAEMU
v
 member countries in real and nominal 
terms. In the short- and long-term, using an error correction model, it highlights the real and 
nominal effects to emphasize the indirect effect of inflation whose control is a key objective 
of monetary policy (Unlike Bernard (2000), it performs an empirical investigation in time 
series). Ndiaye C. T. (2009) evaluates the relative effectiveness of monetary and fiscal 
policies in Senegal and concludes that the relative effectiveness of monetary and fiscal 
policies remains subject to sources of uncertainty related to unpredictable shocks from outside 
due to the weakness of automatic stabilizers.  
 
By focusing again on the effectiveness of monetary policy in sub-Saharan Saxegaard (2006) 
shows that the excess liquidity would have a negative effect, by the weakening of the 
transmission mechanisms of economic policy, thereby reducing monetary authorities power to 
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influence demand conditions in the economy. By studying the empirical link between the 
CMP and economic growth in Africa in general and in the CEMAC zone in particular using 
econometric panel data methodology, Nguena C. L. (2009, 2012) found that the CMP in terms 
of the fight against inflation has a significant and negative impact on economic growth of 
states in the sub region and for Africa countries.  
In sum, the empirical analyzes conducted on this subject have the advantage to suggest less 
ambiguous conclusions than work that attaches directly to quantify the impact of monetary 
policy on real activity.  
 
A parallel observation of statistics on inflation and economic growth evolution in Africa could 
be rich in learning about achievements in terms of the growth of monetary policies in Africa. 
By observing the figure below (performance corresponding to the two extreme dates (1975 
and 2015.), implicitly belonging to two different periods of previously applied Keynesian 
policies and recent policies inspired by monetarist theories), we find a decrease of inflation 
(from 11% to 5.53%: decrease of 5.47%) higher than the increase in economic growth rate 
(from 3.80% to 5.41%: increase 1.61%). Moreover, African economies are different from 
Western economies in that they are in majority developing countries synonymous of higher 
potential uses of resources however relatively limited by the monetary policy objective of 
price stability. Keynesian policies would be most welcome in this environment. Since the 
growth cost is inflation, the flexibility afforded by an environment of low inflation rate would 
become useful to monetary authorities. There are countless examples where such policies 
have been used successfully in the past in the Asian countries including a latest decision to 
forget policy rules and choice of intervention policy to save the European and American 
economies from financial and debt crises.  
Figure: Sub Saharan Africa’s inflation rate and economic growth evolution. 
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Source :Author calculation based on World Bank data base (2008) and International 
Monetary Fund data base (2010 estimation).  
 
The Federal Reserve with declared final objective which is a sustainable economic growth 
may be cited as an example. Since the beginning of crisis in 2007, the Federal Reserve 
embarked on a massive effort to stimulate growth by lowering interest rates to zero since 
December 2008 and by financing the government debt for more than U.S. $ 2 billion. Indeed 
Bloomberg Journal report of November 2011 shows that the Central bank has made 
emergency loans, purchased assets and other aid totaling more than $ 7.5 billion U.S. 
 
In July 1998 the emphasis of the recession led the Malaysian authorities to review their 
economic policies in deciding to opt for Keynesian anti-cyclical policies (low interest rates, 
increase money supply) aimed to reverse the recessionary trend (Bouzonville N. et al., 2006). 
Malaysia has moved from a liberal-inspired IMF
vi
 program to more Keynesian policies from 
the summer of 1998 by globally insulating its economy from the instability in the region by 
imposing strict controls on capital to protect its liquidity asset and continue to fund the 
economic recovery. 
  
According to UNECA
vii
 (2012) The two central banks in the CFA
viii
 zone, for example 
maintained interest rates at a low level in 2011 despite the tightening measures of monetary 
policy taken by the European Central Bank early that year. Lastly, first providing a 
predictable slowdown in economic activity in the CEMAC zone in 2013 in conjunction with 
the decline in oil production and in public investment and; secondly, noting that growth is 
mainly driven by the non-oil sector (agriculture, manufacturing and service industries), the 
BEAC
ix
 decided to implement the recommendation of this paper which is monetary policy 
with a direct objective of economic growth. Indeed, noting a slower growth cohabiting with 
relatively controlled inflationary pressures and based on a study of various factors influencing 
monetary and financial stability in the short term, the BEAC through its Monetary Policy 
Committee (CPM) of July 2013 decided to drop by 50 basis points the interest rate (TIAO) 
applied to banks from 4% to 3.5%. This recommendation is especially justified by the fact 
that the expected maximum pressure on the price is 2.7%, which is indeed below the 
community standard. 
Based on similar findings and in order to support economic activity in the WAEMU
x
 sub 
region, the Monetary Policy Committee (CPM) of the BCEAO
xi
 in June 2013 decided to keep 
interest rates unchanged at their current low levels. The minimum interest rate for submission 
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to calls for application operations for liquidity injection and interest rate of the marginal 
lending desk remains fixed respectively between 2.75% and 3.75%. Similarly, the Central 
Bank of South Africa has maintained its policy of low interest rates during 2011 for most part 
with an objective of economic expansion. These practical examples of initiatives are to 
encourage as well as set an example for other African countries with relative good results in 
terms of price stability.  
 
5) CONCLUSION AND ECONOMIC POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS  
According to statistics, the CMP in terms of the price stability objective paradox is fully 
verified in Africa. With this reality, deep institutional changes are necessary. Highlights on 
what should be the explicit objective of monetary policy to play its full part in the 
development process. While it seems to be a consensus in developed economies to limit the 
mission of monetary policy to price stability, however it appears difficult for poor countries 
with low inflation, to not tailor the policy towards economic development. The success of 
African economies therefore requires the adoption by the central bank a mandate that 
combines the priority objectives of activity to the price stability; this assuming a 
comprehensive reform of the ongoing monetary policy framework.  
Empirical works mentioned above that have shown a negative impact of price stability on 
economic growth in Africa would find an explanation in the fact that the objectives of price 
stability and economic growth are opposed according to Keynesians. Indeed we could 
establish a policy that would lead them simultaneously since improving one can drive down 
the other. Therefore, instead of continuing to work towards achieving the objective of price 
stability, we must make this objective relative in view of the evolution of real variables in the 
sub-region including economic growth which is very low. In the same view, the fact that the 
financial crises have recently pushed most Northern countries to opt for regulation in 
response, thus making the independence and credibility of their central banks relative, should 
be an example to African countries. In addition (to strengthening this conclusion), as a result 
of post-crisis Bretton Woods instructions, the fiscal instrument was found to have relatively 
limited scope for growth in African countries. In light of the above, we are poised to 
recommend the promotion of monetary policy oriented primarily towards the improvement of 
economic growth in African countries through temporarily Keynesian cyclical policies.  
As mentioned in the paper, several central banks such as the BEAC, the BCEAO, the Central 
Bank of South Africa…etc. are currently applying measure based on this recommendation by 
not only focusing on price stability but also maintaining interest rates at a low level to sustain 
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economic growth. These practical actions should be encouraged in relation to the results of 
our analysis and serve as an example for other central banks which have focused primarily on 
price stability with good results in Africa. 
 
REFERENCES: 
1.  AfDB (2013), Annual Development Effectiveness Review: “Towards Sustainable Growth 
for Africa”. http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and 
Operations/ADER%20Annual%20Development%20Effectiveness%20Review%202013.pdf 
2. Asongu, S. A., (2013a), “Fighting consumer price inflation in Africa. What do dynamics in 
money, credit, efficiency and size tell us?”, Journal of Financial Economic Policy, 5(1). 
3.  Asongu, S. A., (2013b), “A Short-run Schumpeterian Trip to Embryonic African 
Monetary Zones”, Economics Bulletin, 33(1), pp. 859-873.  
4. Asongu, S. A., (2013c), “How has politico-economic liberalization affected financial 
allocation efficiency? Fresh African Evidence”, Economics Bulletin, 33(1), pp. 663-676.  
5. Bernard Eric (2000) : « Développement financier, politique monétaire et croissance 
économique : validation empiriques en données de panel », Laboratoire d’Economie 
d’Orléans. 
6. Blanchar, O., & J. Gali, (2005), “Real wage rigidities and the new Keynesian model”, 
FRB/JMCB Conference on Quantitive evidence on Price Determination, Washington. 
7. Bouzonville N. et al. (2006), «Le contrôle de capitaux en Malaisie», Reims Management 
school ; http://anthonypierre.perso.neuf.fr/documents/Ecomalaisie.pdf 
8. Comité de Politique Monétaire (CPM) de la BEAC « Communiqué de presse », Séance 
du 19 juillet 2013 ; https://www.beac.int/download/cpm_juillet2013.pdf. 
9. Comité de Politique Monétaire (CPM) de la BCEAO « Communiqué de presse » Séance 
du 3 juin 2013 ;  http://www.bceao.int/Communique-de-presse-de-la-reunion,2666.html 
10.  Epstein, G. (2006), « Central banks as agents of economic development », UNU-
WIDER, Research paper N° 2006/54, May 2006 
11. Friedman, M. (1968), « Le rôle de la politique monétaire », The American Economic 
Review. 
12. Gali, J. (2002), ‘New Perspectives on Monetary Policy, Inflation, and the Business 
Cycle’, National Bureau of Economic Research, Working paper 8767. 
13. Goodfriend (2010), « Financial stability, deflation and monetary policy », Monetary and 
Economic Studies, Bank of Japan, Special Edition, February. 
14. Kone (2000), « L’impact des politiques monétaires et budgetaires sur la croissance 
économique dans les Pays de l’UEMOA », BCEAO Working Paper. 
15. Mésonnier (2004), « Le paradoxe de la crédibilité en question », Direction des Études 
économiques et de la Recherche, Bulletin de la Banque de France - N° 122 – Février 2004. 
16. Ndiaye, C. (2009) «Analyse de l’efficacité relative des politiques monétaire et budgétaire 
au Sénégal». http://www.univ-orleans.fr/leo/semmar9/sem_doctorants/ndiaye.pdf 
 14 
17. Ndjanyou, L. (2001), « Risque, incertitude et financement bancaire des PME 
Camerounaises : l’exigence d’une logique spécifique de l’analyse du risque », S/D Tsapi V., 
édition clé, pp. 327-343.  
18. Nguena, C. L. (2009), “Credible Monetary Policy in CEMAC zone and Economic 
Growth: a Panel Data Approach”, African Economic Research Consortium (AERC). 
http://www.aercafrica.org/documents/rethinkingworkshoppapers/NguenaPolitique.pdf 
19. Nguena, C. L. (2012), “Fight against inflation and economic growth in Africa: the need 
of alternative”; UNECA-UNDP Seminar Series.  
20. Nguena, C. L. (2013), “Financing of SMEs in Cameroon in the context of financial 
crisis”, CIEA-FR Rapport de recherché final. www.trustafrica.org/icbe 
21. Saxegaard, M., (2006). “Excess liquidity and effectiveness of monetary policy: evidence 
from sub-saharan africa“, Working Paper n° 115, IMF, P1-52. 
22. Tinbergen (1954), “On the Theory of Economic Policy”. Revue économique; Vol. 5. 
23. UNECA (2012), “Unleashing Africa’s Potential as a Pole of Global Growth”; 
http://www.uneca.org/eca_resources/Publications/books/era2012/front.pdf 
24. UNECA (2012), « Vue d’ensemble de la situation économique et sociale en Afrique en 
2011 », Réunion du Comité d’experts Addis-Abeba (Éthiopie) 22-25 mars 2012. 
http://www.uneca.org/cfm/2012/documents/French/COM12-OverviewEconomic-
andSocialConditions-inAfricaFR.pdf 
25. Woodford (2003). “Interest and Prices, Foundations of a Theory of Monetary Policy”, 
Princeton University Press. 
 
                                                 
i
 Credible Monetary Policy in terms of price stability objective. 
ii
 In this work, we consider that a monetary policy is credible when it guarantees the continuity of Central Bank 
action in pursuing its objective of price stability, and managed to stop monetary funding of budget deficits. 
iii
 This chart was deduced from that presented in the article of Mésonnier (2004). 
iv
 Gross Domestic Product. 
v
 West African Economic and Monetary Union. 
vi
 International Monetary Fund. 
vii
 United Nations - Economic Commission for Africa. 
viii
 African Financial Community. 
ix
 Central Bank of Central African States including 6 African countries: Cameroon, Congo, Gabon, Equatorial 
Guinea, Chad, and Central African Republic. 
x
 West African Economic and Monetary Union. 
xi
 Central Bank for West African Countries including 8 African countries: Ivory Coast, Guinea Bissau, Mali, 
Niger, Senegal, Togo, Benin and Burkina Faso. 
